Community perspective: Widening inequality hurts us all by Robert B. Reich
H
ow did America go from the Great Depres-
sion of the 1930s to thirty years of what might 
be termed the Great Prosperity between 1947 
and 1977? And from there, to thirty years of 
stagnant incomes and widening inequality, culminating in 
a Great Recession and one of the most anemic recoveries 
on record? It was no accident. 
The Great Prosperity
During  three  decades  from  1947  to  1977, America 
implemented the basic bargain – providing its workers 
enough  money  to  buy  what  they  produced.  Produc-
tivity grew in tandem with wages. Labor productivity – 
average output per hour worked – doubled. So did median 
incomes. Expressed in 2007 dollars, the typical family’s 
income rose from about $25,000 to $55,000. The bargain 
was cinched. 
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But here’s the really interesting thing. We became more 
equal. The wages of workers in the bottom fifth grew 116 
percent – faster than the pay of those in the top fifth (which 
rose 99 percent), and in the top five percent (86 percent). 
By the late 1940s, the nation was “more than halfway to 
perfect equality,” as the National Bureau of Economic Re-
search wryly observed. But as the economy grew almost 
everyone came out ahead, including those at the top. 
The Great Prosperity also marked the culmination of a 
reorganization of work that had begun during the Depres-
sion. Perhaps most significantly, government increased the 
bargaining leverage of ordinary workers. They were guar-
anteed the right to join labor unions, with which employ-
ers had to bargain in good faith. By the mid 1950s more 
than a third of all workers were unionized. UAW presi-
dent Walter Reuther, among others, explicitly invoked the 
basic bargain: “Unless we get a more realistic distribu-
































ytion of America’s wealth,” he threatened, “we won’t get 
enough to keep this machinery going.” Employers relent-
ed, and the higher wages kept the machinery going better 
than ever by giving average workers more money to buy 
what they produced. (Non-unionized companies, fearing 
their  workers  would  otherwise  want  a  union,  offered 
similar deals.) And because health and pension benefits 
were not taxed, big employers added ever more generous 
provisions. 
Americans also enjoyed economic security against the 
risks of economic life – not only unemployment benefits 
but also, through Social Security, insurance against dis-
ability,  loss  of  a  major  breadwinner,  workplace  injury, 
and inability to save enough for retirement. In 1965 came 
health insurance for the elderly and the poor (Medicare 
and Medicaid). Economic security proved the handmaid-
en of prosperity. In requiring Americans to share the costs 
of adversity it enabled them to share the benefits of peace 
of mind. And by offering peace of mind, it freed them to 
consume the fruits of their labors.   
Government also widened access to higher education. 
The GI Bill paid college costs for those who returned from 
war. The expansion of public universities – whose tuitions 
averaged about four percent of median family incomes 
during the Great Prosperity in contrast to the 20 percent 
then  demanded  by  private  universities  –  made  higher 
education affordable to the American middle class. Con-
sequently, college enrollments surged. By 1970, seventy 
percent of the nation’s four-year post-secondary students 
were in public universities and colleges. The federal gov-
ernment, especially the Defense Department, also under-
wrote a growing portion of university research, especially 
in the sciences. 
Notwithstanding  all  this,  the  nation  also  found  the 
time and money in these years to rebuild Western Europe 
and Japan – spending billions of dollars to restore foreign 
factories, roads, railways, and schools. The effort proved 
an astounding success. The years 1945 to 1970 witnessed 
the most dramatic and widely shared economic growth in 
the history of the world, which contributed to America’s 
Great Prosperity. In helping restore the world’s leading 
economies and thus keep communism at bay, the new 
global system of trade and assistance created vast new op-
portunities for American corporations – far richer, larger, 
and more technologically advanced than any other – to 
expand and prosper. 
Government paid for all of this with tax revenues from 
an expanding middle class whose incomes were rising. 
Revenues were also boosted by those at the top of the 
income ladder whose marginal taxes were far higher than 
today’s. The top marginal income tax rate during World 
War II was over 68 percent. In the 1950s, under Dwight 
Eisenhower, whom few would call a radical, it rose to 
91 percent. In the 1960s, the highest marginal rate was 
around 70 percent. Even after exploiting all possible de-
ductions  and  credits,  the  typical  high-income  taxpayer 
paid a marginal federal tax of over 50 percent. But con-
trary to what conservative commentators had predicted, 
the high tax rates did not hobble economic growth. To the 
contrary, they enabled the nation to expand middle-class 
prosperity and fuel growth.  
America of that era still harbored vast inequalities, of 
course. The very poor remained almost invisible. Blacks 
were still relegated to second-class citizenship. Few women 
dared aspire to professions other than teaching or nursing. 
But such barriers would eventually weaken or disappear. 
And although the era also engendered a blandness, unifor-
mity, and materialism that many found abhorrent, the Great 
Prosperity offered more Americans more opportunities to 
make whatever life they wanted more than ever before. It 
significantly expanded the portion of total income going to 
the middle class. And it proved that widely-shared income 
gains were not incompatible with widespread economic 
growth; they were, in fact, essential to it. 
The Great Regression, 1980 to 2008
During the Great Prosperity of 1947-1977, the vast 
middle class received an increasing share of the benefits 
of economic growth. But after that point, the two lines 
began to diverge: output per hour – a measure of produc-
tivity – continued to rise. But real hourly compensation 
was left in the dust.
Contrary to popular belief, trade and technology have 
not reduced the overall number of American jobs. Their 
more profound effect has been on pay. Rather than be out 
of work, most Americans have quietly settled for lower 
real wages, or wages that have risen more slowly than 
the overall growth of the economy per person. Although 
unemployment  following  the  Great  Recession  remains 
unusually high, jobs are slowly returning – but in order 
to  get  them,  many  workers  have  to  accept  lower  pay 
than before. Trade and technology have driven a wedge 
between the earnings of people at the top and everyone 
else. The pay of well-connected graduates of prestigious 
colleges and MBA programs – the so-called “talent” who 
reached the pinnacles of power in executive suites and on 
Wall Street – has soared. But the pay and benefits of most 
other workers has either flattened or dropped. And the 
ensuing division has also made most middle-class Ameri-
can families less economically secure. 
. . . widely-shared income gains were 
not incompatible with widespread 
economic growth; they were, in fact, 
essential to it. 
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to these forces that were conferring an increasing share of 
economic growth on a small group at the top and leaving 
most other Americans behind. With the gains from that 
growth, the nation could, for example, have expanded 
our  educational  system  to  encompass  early-childhood 
education  and  better  equipped  our  public  schools.  It 
could  have  supported  affordable  public  universities, 
created more job retraining, and better and more exten-
sive public transportation. 
In  these  and  many  other  ways,  government  could 
have reinforced the basic bargain. But it did the opposite. 
Starting in the late 1970s, and with increasing fervor over 
the next three decades, it deregulated and privatized. It 
slashed public goods and investments – whacking school 
budgets, increasing the cost of public higher education, 
reducing job training, cutting public transportation, and 
allowing bridges, ports, and highways to corrode. It shred-
ded safety nets – reducing aid to jobless families with 
children, and cutting unemployment insurance so much 
that by 2007, only 40 percent of the unemployed were 
covered. It halved the top income tax rate from the range 
of 70 to 90 percent that prevailed during the Great Pros-
perity to 28 to 35 percent; allowed many of the nation’s 
rich to treat their income as capital gains subject to no 
more than 15 percent tax; and shrunk inheritance taxes 
that affected only the top-most 1.5 percent of earners. Yet 
at the same time, America boosted sales and payroll taxes, 
both of which took a bigger chunk out of the pay of the 
middle class and the poor than of the well off. 
We allowed companies to break the basic bargain with 
impunity – slashing jobs and wages, cutting benefits, and 
shifting risks to employees (from you-can-count-on-it pen-
sions to do-it-yourself 401(k)s, from good health coverage 
to soaring premiums and deductibles). Companies were 
allowed to bust unions and threaten employees who tried 
to organize (by 2010, fewer than eight percent of private-
sector  workers  were  unionized). And  nothing  impeded 
CEO salaries from skyrocketing to 300 times that of the 
average worker (from 30 times during the Great Prosper-
ity), while the pay of financial executives and traders rose 
into the stratosphere. We stood by as big American com-
panies became global companies with no more loyalty 
or connection to the United States than a G.P.S. satellite. 
Most  telling  of  all,  Washington  deregulated  Wall 
Street while insuring it against major losses. In so doing it 
allowed finance – which until then had been the servant 
of American industry – to become its master, demanding 
short-term profits over long-term growth, and raking in an 
ever-larger portion of the nation’s profits. Between 1997 
and 2007, finance became the fastest-growing part of the 
U.S. economy. Two-thirds of the growth in the Gross Na-
tional Product was attributable to the gains of financial 
executives,  traders,  and  specialists.  By  2007,  financial 
companies accounted for over forty percent of American 
corporate profits and almost as great a percentage of pay, 
up from ten percent during the Great Prosperity. 
The Cause of Our Unraveling
Some argue America did so little because Americans 
lost confidence in government. They have cause and effect 
backwards. The tax revolts that thundered across America 
starting in the late 1970s were not so much ideological 
revolts against government – Americans still wanted all 
the government services they had before, and then some 
– as backlash against paying more taxes on incomes that 
had  stagnated.  Inevitably,  government  services  deterio-
rated and government deficits exploded, confirming the 
public’s growing cynicism about government’s capacity to 
do anything right. Furthermore, the inflation of the 1970s 
wasn’t due to government spending. It was the result of 
an eightfold hike in world oil prices engineered by the oil 
cartel and a drop in the value of the dollar. When inflation 
began to accelerate, federal spending was only one per-
centage point higher as a proportion of GDP than it had 
been in the first half of 1960s.
The real reason for the reversal of the pendulum was 
political. As income and wealth became more concen-
trated  in  fewer  hands,  politics  reverted  to  what  former 
Federal Reserve Chair Marriner Eccles described in the 
1920s as when people “with great economic power had 
an undue influence in making the rules of the economic 
game.” With hefty campaign contributions, and platoons 
of lobbyists and PR flacks, the rich pushed legal changes 
that enabled them to accumulate even more income and 
wealth – including tacit permission to bust unions, slash 
corporate payrolls, and reduce benefits; lower taxes for 
themselves;  and  deregulation  of  Wall  Street.  Since  so 
much of their wealth depends on the performance of the 
stock market, they particularly wanted to free up the Street 
to put greater pressure on companies to perform. The plan 
worked. The Dow Jones Industrial Average took off – rising 
tenfold between 1980 and 2000. 
Americans accepted the backward swing of the pen-
dulum because they mitigated its effects. Starting in the 
late 1970s, the American middle class honed three coping 
mechanisms, allowing it to behave as though it was still 
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ytaking  home  the  same  share  of  total  income  as  it  had 
during the Great Prosperity, and to spend as if nothing 
substantially had changed. Not until these coping mecha-
nisms became exhausted in the Great Recession would 
the underlying reality be exposed. 
Coping mechanism # 1: Women move into paid work. 
Starting in the late 1970s, and escalating in the 1980s 
and 1990s, women went into paid work in greater and 
greater numbers. For the relatively small sliver of women 
with four-year college degrees, this was the natural conse-
quence of wider educational opportunities and new laws 
against gender discrimination that opened professions to 
well-educated women. But the vast majority of women 
who migrated into paid work did so in order to prop up 
family incomes, as households were hit by the stagnant or 
declining wages of male workers. 
This transition of women into paid work has been one 
of the most important social and economic changes to 
occur over the last four decades. It has reshaped American 
families and challenged traditional patterns of child-rear-
ing and child care. Its magnitude has been extraordinary. 
In 1966, twenty percent of mothers with young children 
worked outside the home. By the late 1990s, the propor-
tion had risen to sixty percent. For married women with 
children under the age of six, the transformation has been 
even more dramatic – from twelve percent in the 1960s to 
fifty-five percent by the late 1990s. 
Families seem to have reached the limit, however – 
a point of diminishing returns where the costs of hiring 
others to see to the running of a household or to take care 
of the children, or both, exceeds the apparent benefits of 
the additional income. 
Coping mechanism # 2: Everyone works longer hours. 
By the mid 2000s it was not uncommon for men to work 
more than sixty hours a week, and women to work more 
than  fifty.  Professionals  put  in  more  “billable”  hours. 
Hourly workers relied on overtime. A growing number of 
people took on two or three jobs, each demanding twenty 
or more hours. All told, by the 2000s, the typical Ameri-
can worker worked more than 2,200 hours a year – 350 
hours  more  than  the  average  European  worked,  more 
hours even than the typically industrious Japanese put in. 
It was many more hours than the typical American mid-
dle-class family had worked in 1979 – five hundred hours 
longer, a full twelve weeks more. Americans seemed to 
have reached a limit. Even if they can find the work, they 
can’t find any more time. 
Coping  mechanism  #3:  Draw  down  savings  and 
borrow to the hilt. After exhausting the first two coping 
mechanisms, the only way Americans could keep con-
suming as before was to save less and go deeper into debt. 
During the Great Prosperity the American middle class 
saved about nine percent of their after-tax incomes each 
year. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, that portion had 
been whittled down to about seven percent. The savings 
rate then dropped to six percent in 1994, and on down to 
three percent in 1999. By 2008, Americans saved nothing. 
Meanwhile, household debt exploded. During the Great 
Prosperity debt had averaged around 50 to 55 percent 
of  after-tax  income.  That  included  what  people  owed 
on their mortgages. But starting in 1980 debt took off. In 
2001, Americans owed as much as their entire after-tax 
income that year. By 2007, the typical American owed 
138 percent of their after-tax income. 
Americans  borrowed  from  everywhere.  Credit  card 
solicitations flooded mail boxes; many American wallets 
bulged with dozens of such cards, all amassing larger and 
larger debt loads. Auto loans were easy to come by. Stu-
dents and their families went deep into debt to pay the 
costs of college. But far and away, the largest borrowing 
was to buy homes. Mortgage debt exploded. As housing 
values continued to rise, homes doubled as ATMs. Con-
sumers refinanced their homes with even larger mortgages 
and used their homes as collateral for additional loans. 
As long as housing prices continued to rise, it seemed a 
painless way to get additional money (in 1980 the average 
home sold for $62,000; by 2006 it went for $245,000). 
Between 2002 and 2007, American households extracted 
$2.3 trillion from their houses, putting themselves ever 
more deeply into the hole. 
Eventually, of course, the debt bubble burst. With it, the 
last coping mechanism ended. Each of these mechanisms 
reached its inevitable limit. And when the debt bubble 
burst, most Americans woke up to a startling reality: They 
could no longer afford to live as they had been living; nor 
as they thought they should be living, given the growth 
in the economy; nor as they expected to be living, given 
how their pay used to grow when the economy grew; nor 
as they assumed they could be living, given the lavish life-
styles of people at the top of the income ladder. 
The Future       
The economic challenge ahead is to lift the means of 
middle-class Americans and reconstitute the basic bargain 
linking wages to overall gains – providing the vast Ameri-
can middle class with a share of economic gains sufficient 
to allow them to purchase more of what the economy can 
produce. One step toward reestablishing shared prosper-
ity would be expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit. 
The EITC has not only helped reduce poverty but has in-
creased the incomes of families most likely to spend that 
additional money, and thereby create more jobs. In 2011, 
the EITC was the nation’s largest anti-poverty program. 
Over 24 million households received wage supplements. 
Given what’s happened to middle-class incomes, the EITC 
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plan,  full-time  workers  earning  $20,000  or  below  (this 
and all subsequent figures are in 2010 dollars) would get 
a wage supplement of $15,000. This supplement would 
decline  incrementally  to  $10,000  for  full-time  workers 
earning $30,000; to $5,000 for full-time workers earning 
$40,000; and then to zero for full-time workers earning 
$50,000. Along with expanding the EITC, I’d recommend 
that marginal tax rates be lowered for the middle class. 
The income tax rates of full-time workers earning between 
$50,000  and  $90,000  should  be  cut  to  ten  percent  of 
earnings, and of workers earning between $90,000 and 
$140,000 to 20 percent of their earnings.
The yearly cost to the federal government of expanding 
the EITC and reducing middle-class taxes would be ap-
proximately $634 billion a year (in 2010 dollars). This lost 
revenue could be replaced by a tax on fossil fuels (coal, 
oil, and gas), based on how many tons of carbon dioxide 
such fuels contain. The tax would be collected at the mine 
or port of entry for each fossil fuel, and would gradually 
rise over time in order to push energy companies and 
users to spew less carbon into the atmosphere. If initially 
set at $35 per metric ton of carbon-dioxide or its equiva-
lent, such a tax would raise over $210 billion in its first 
year alone. By the time it reached $115 per ton, it would 
yield about $600 billion per year. The public wouldn’t di-
rectly pay this tax, but would indirectly pay it to the extent 
the prices of goods rise in proportion to how much carbon 
is used in their production. For example, a tax of $115 per 
ton would add about $1 to the price of a gallon of gasoline 
and 6 cents per kilowatt-hour to the price of electricity. But 
if the revenues from the carbon tax went into an expanded 
EITC and lower taxes on the middle class, most Americans 
would still come out far ahead. A carbon tax has two ad-
ditional advantages. It would push energy companies and 
businesses to invest in new ways to reduce greenhouse 
gases, and in lower-carbon fuels and products. This would 
prevent overall emissions from increasing beyond current 
levels. The tax will also boost aggregate demand. 
The  Great  Recession  has  accelerated  the  structural 
change in the economy that began in the late 1970s. Large 
numbers of Americans will not be rehired unless they are 
willing to settle for lower wages and benefits. Eventually 
jobs will return, but if the trend continues, more people 
will be working for pay they consider inadequate, more 
working families will be at or near poverty, and inequality 
will have widened.
Nor  will  households  be  able  to  borrow  as  before. 
Lending  standards  have  tightened,  and  bank  regulators 
and new regulations will require prudence. Meanwhile, a 
large number of Americans are paying off, paying down, or 
walking away from trillions of dollars of outstanding loans – 
in a vast “deleveraging” of household finances that is likely 
to continue for years. At the same time, tens of millions of 
boomers  are  approaching  retirement  with  nest  eggs  that 
have shrunk to the size of peanuts, and must save in earnest. 
All this means less consumption as a proportion of 
the overall economy than before the Great Recession. Al-
though consumers have to replace cars, appliances, and 
other things that run out or wear out or finally break down, 
and businesses have to replace inventories that become so 
depleted they have nothing left to sell or ship, a lasting 
recovery cannot be based on replacements. 
Where  will  demand  come  from  without  a  buoyant 
American  middle  class?  Absent  their  spending,  private 
investors have little incentive to buy new equipment or 
software, new commercial buildings or factories; entre-
preneurs have little incentive to embark on new research 
and develop new products and services. Government can 
fill the gap for a time, but government cannot continue in-
definitely to stimulate the economy with deficit spending 
or by printing money.  Nor can we rely on exports to fill 
the gap. Exports will remain a relatively small proportion 
of our economy. Other economies – even the Chinese – 
are relying on net exports to maintain their employment. 
It is impossible for every large economy, including the 
United States, to become a net exporter. 
Hence our underlying dilemma. As we should have 
learned during the Great Prosperity – the thirty years after 
World War II when America grew because most Ameri-
cans shared in the nation’s prosperity – we cannot have 
a growing and vibrant economy without a growing and 
vibrant middle class.     
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